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Going Glocal in a Pandemic: Can Japan Offer 
Lessons for Others? 
 
Searching for Lessons from Japan Glocal 
The COVID-19 pandemic attacked the worldwide economy. While the 
long-term effects of the pandemic are still unpredictable, leaders in most 
countries have begun to look for ways of rebuilding their damaged 
economies. One possible way to revive the damaged economies is not 
only to mitigate lockdowns and allow retail and restaurant operations 
domestically, but also to reopen the borders and restart international 
economic activities. Several EU countries began to accept travelers 
from the 27 EU countries and other Schengen countries. Of course, as 
new waves of the pandemic emerged in various countries, the policies of 
keeping borders open or closed kept changing, often abruptly. 
In this situation, the leaders try to learn which countries have managed 
the pandemic well in order to contain it. Till the end of June 2020 (the first 
wave of the pandemic), Japan was one of the countries which managed 
well in terms of minimizing the impacts of this pandemic (Harding 2020; 
Saito 2020). Even after the third wave had come in November and 
December 2020, The Economist (2021) focused on global 
overestimation or underestimation of pandemic deaths. According to this 
report, the death count in most countries was extremely underestimated. 
The Economist estimated that actual deaths in many countries were 
twice to four times the reported numbers. The worst country – according 
to this report – was Russia. The report applauded Japan's achievement, 
where it seems deaths were over-reported by 30,000; i.e., actual deaths 
were fewer than what was reported. 
Japan coped with this pandemic with extremely low number of 
PCR (polymerase chain reaction) tests and quite lax declarations and 
enforcements of emergency. Furthermore, the emergency statement 
issued by the Prime Minister Abe on April 7, 2020 was not accompanied 
by legal punishments and penalties. It was nothing more than a "please 
do, please don’t" plea for restraints about going out and suggestions for 
closing shops and restaurants. While enforced lockdown was not 
implemented in Japan, most of the Japanese heeded the plea and 
followed the suggested guidelines. The Japanese people spontaneously 
stayed home from April 8 to May 7, 2020. 
The purpose of this Dialogue contribution is to search for 
lessons from the Japanese countermeasures against the COVID-19 
pandemic. This contribution approaches this issue from a social point of 
view. Specifically, it focuses on social understanding process of an 
uncertainty event – in this case the COVID-19 pandemic – by the 
Japanese. The exploration of this understanding process can reveal 
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what the "Japanese Glocal" characteristics are. The discussion starts 
with the typical Japanese way of ‘being convinced’.  
What follows deals with three topics. The first is a summary of 
the typical Japanese attitude toward change of conditions. From this 
discussion, we learn that we Japanese are overwhelmingly confident in 
our methods when the conditions are stable, but – once conditions 
change – we quickly lose our confidence. This rapid, almost radical, shift 
of assertions is a peculiarly Japanese way of thinking and reflection. The 
first example in the discussion that follows is about the high praise of 
Japanese management around 1970s, and the rapid disappearance of 
such praise. The second example – of the Japanese attitudes toward 
changing conditions – is based on the debate on globalization that took 
place in Japan in the 1980s. To the Japanese, globalization initially 
represented absolute uncertainty. In the beginning, the Japanese 
criticized the emerging globalization conditions and insisted on the 
adjustment to these conditions. Next came the counterarguments. Then 
– this is important – the Japanese quit the discussions and were 
watching what happens next. This is the typical process for the 
Japanese to understand the uncertainty of unfolding events. 
The third part of this contribution is the discussion and 
evaluation of the Japanese attitude and countermeasures against 
COVID-19 in 2020. From this discussion, we can glean the "flip-flop" 
attitude evident in Japan. This attitude can be characterized as rapid 
change of one’s opinions, as if swinging wildly from right to left. This 
attitude stems from the ‘unlearning’ habit of Japanese, that we call the 
"Japanese Glocal". Finally, this paper concludes that there remain huge 
difficulties in learning from Japan’s ‘success’ against COVID-19; and 
uncertainties and challenges continue. 
Discussions on COVID-19, Deja Vu 
This section discusses the general Japanese attitude toward changing 
conditions. It illustrates a parallel structure of Japanese attitudes to 
changing conditions, which were experienced in the 1970s, and the 
present times. The high-praise of Japanese management in that period 
resembles the praise for the COVID-19 countermeasures of Japan. 
As discussed above, compared to EU countries and United 
States, Japan – at least in the first half of 2020 – was recognized as one 
of the countries that successfully managed the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Therefore, some countries began to explore the Japanese ways. This is 
because Japan seems to have responded to COVID-19 better than the 
EU and the United States without strict and severe lockdowns, in spite of 
Japan's statistics of COVID-19 pandemic – in terms of the cases and 
deaths per million – being higher than other Asian countries that had 
very strict controls. 
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Many varieties of hypotheses about Japan’s relative pandemic 
success without strict lockdowns – from the BCG (Bacillus 
Calmette-Guérin vaccine, the anti-tuberculosis vaccine, given to babies) 
thesis to notions of the Japanese sanitary habits – have been 
advanced. The BCG (tuberculosis or TB preventive vaccination) angle 
argues that countries with TB cases, and the use of the BCG 
vaccination at infancy, have fewer number of COVID-19 deaths 
(Shivendu et al. 2020). With regard to the local habits hypothesis, Mr. 
Aso of the Ministry of Finance – well-known for his frequent gaffes – 
declared that the salutary results regarding the pandemic can be 
explained by the ‘highly civilized level’ of Japanese people. His features 
of the highly civilized level included spontaneous restraints on going 
out, always wearing a mask, washing hands well, gargling, and 
removing shoes when entering houses. 
When examining the June 2020 situation (of claimed success 
against the pandemic), we should recall the kind of discussions the 
Japanese had in March 2020, early days of the pandemic. Those 
discussions strongly criticized the delayed response by the government, 
with warnings of medical system collapse, and praise for the strict and 
rigorous lockdowns in foreign countries. In April, Dr. Shibuya, Professor 
at Kings College in London, warned that Japan's countermeasures to 
COVID-19 were out of step compared to the global standards: he 
argued for strict lockdowns, much more intensive PCR testing, and 
quick quarantine policies (Shibuya 2020). In general, countermeasures 
against COVID-19 in Japan were worse than those in the US, UK, 
France, and Germany. 
This "flip-flop" attitude is a peculiar characteristic of the 
Japanese. Such patterns of attitudes can be seen in many cases. The 
most famous one was the attitude toward the Emperor when the World 
War II was over. Before January 1, 1946, the Emperor was an avatar of 
the Supreme Deity, divinity incarnate in human form. When Japanese 
soldiers died in war, these deaths were praised as occurring for the 
divine Emperor's sake. On January 1, 1946, the Supreme Commander 
of the Allied Powers asked the Showa Emperor, Hirohito, to proclaim 
the Humanity Declaration. The Japanese quickly fell in line and 
recognized the Emperor as a human. 
A similar structure of such attitude flip-flops can be seen in the 
1970s – when there was high praise for Japanese management. In 
those days, the Japanese had big boosts in confidence because 
observers from the United States of America, the victorious country in 
World War II, praised Japanese management, with the book Japan as 
Number One becoming an icon (Vogel 1979). Before this work, typical 
Japanese success stories were characterized by specific management 
methods: permanent employment, seniority-wage system, and 
enterprise-specific unions (Abegglen 1958). Unlike the prevailing 
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discussions about Japanese success, Vogel (1979) attributed and 
analyzed Japan's managerial success from a cultural point of view. He 
found that the Japanese showed strong will and habits for learning and 
reading. Japanese reading habits were twice as strong and prevalent as 
those of Americans, evidenced in the large number of bookstores and 
high circulation of newspapers in Japan. Going further, Vogel 
recommended that Americans can learn from Japanese diligence. 
Some of advocates even went so far as to say that – having climbed to 
the Number One spot – in Japan, nothing remained to be learned from 
America (Morita, Reingold and Shimomura 1986). 
Of course, we cannot continue to trace back the discussions of 
the contemporary times to the 1970s because the vaunted Japanese 
management system was already regarded as having many elements 
that retarded Japan’s ability to adjust to global standards in the 1980s 
and beyond. Therefore, we need to turn next to discussions about 
Japan’s adjustments to globalization. 
Discussions on Globalization in Japan 
Early in the 1980s, Japan encountered big uncertainty of unfolding 
events, in terms of rapid globalization. Not only in business sectors, but 
also in public sectors, including education, the Japanese were afraid of 
globalization because it would destroy their everyday lives. 
During such times and phases, the Japanese often make 
arguments that are often polarized to the extreme. In Japan, one side of 
the argument regarding globalization was this process as borderless, 
and the other and polar side was about globalization with 
‘borderfullness’. The border implies many kinds of obstacles, such as 
country's own laws, tariffs, trade customs, and non-tariff barriers to 
trade; hence borderless economy refers to one with no barriers. In an 
extreme case, borderless means that one global regulation covers 
world's economic transactions. In contrast, borderfull(ness) implies that 
several obstacles remain and interfere with such ideal and smooth, 
unfettered economic transactions. 
One side in this debate warned that Japanese management 
was not diversified, the Japanese decision processes were too slow, 
and Japanese regulations put barriers for foreign investors to enter 
Japanese markets. Therefore, those Japan-specific customs should be 
updated to adjust to the global era (Ohmae 1990). 
Structural Impediments Initiatives (SII) was the typical example 
of this type of discussion. SII began to reduce international trade deficit 
of USA in 1989. United States Department of the Treasury recognized 
that the closed nature of the Japanese markets caused this huge trade 
deficit. This closed nature of Japanese markets was characterized by 
complex Japanese trade customs and exclusive, overly elaborate 
distribution structure. The US asked Japan to modify these five 
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non-tariff barriers to US business sectors: the patterns of financial 
saving and investments, taxation of real-estate, commerce and 
distribution systems, the exclusive trade customs by reinforcement of 
Fair-Trade Commission, tight business relationships, and price 
differences between US and Japan. These processes and pressures 
can be regarded as attempts to bring borderless globalization to Japan. 
In contrast to the foregoing, the argument from the other 
extreme criticized the unconditional shift to a borderless globalization 
(Itami 1991). This argument insisted that globalization has two aspects: 
global distribution of the capital (e.g., money, goods and services, and 
information) and movement of human beings and transferring their 
habits. The logic of the economy is characterized by movement of the 
capital. Due to the development of information and communication 
technology, movement of the capital cannot be interrupted by any other 
means, except for political reasons. Human beings and their habits, 
however, cannot move and transfer at the same pace as capital can.  
People in Japan who were afraid of the advancing-invading ‘borderless 
globalization’ toward Japan were relieved to hear the alternative of 
borderful-globalization because they would not have to change their 
customs and habits. As a consequence, the Japanese positively 
accepted US goods and services, but retained their cultural habits. 
Consider the shopping at the huge US retail chain Walmart as an 
example. Walmart entered the Japanese market in 2005, by 
establishing a subsidiary. When the Japanese consumers bought huge 
packages of food products – such as frozen French fries, spinach, and 
broccoli at Walmart – they shared them with neighbors. In other words, 
the American habits of buying and storing huge pack-sizes did not 
transfer over to Japan. 
These are illustrations of the typical structure of the "Japanised" 
(and globalized) controversies. Major structural shifts begin a debate 
between two extreme positions, then each of these are unlearned soon. 
In turn, facts and experiences sublimate and blend the two positions 
into one. For instance, in relation to the Japanese management 
success mania of the 1970s, the blended position is that Japanese 
management sometimes works, but it sometimes fails when the 
conditions have changed. In that case, the important thing is to adjust 
as often as we can, even without logical consistency. Some Japanese 
may call it "aufheben" (to completely cancel, reorient, remove), but it 
should rather perhaps be characterized as ephemeralism – or, in 
colloquial terms – the ‘Japanese Glocal’. 
What Others Can Learn from Japanese Glocal Processes 
Concerning the COVID-19 pandemic, the Japanese show attitude 
similar to what they had in response to the globalization situation. At 
first, we were not afraid of COVID-19. The first case was found on 
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January 16, 2020. Around this time, most of Japanese regarded it as 
same as flu. Japanese Prime Minister Abe celebrated the Chinese New 
Year on January 25 and welcomed the Chinese to Japan. We did 
nothing against COVID-19 until February 25, 2020. At that time, Prime 
Minister Abe decided the lockdown of schools (elementary and junior 
high). Even then, the mass media and most people in Japan stressed 
that there was no need to close schools. 
The situation, however, drastically changed on March 25, 2020. 
The cases in Japan increased precipitately and there was 
postponement announcement of the Olympic Games in Tokyo. As the 
World Health Organization (WHO) had already declared COVID-19 as a 
worldwide pandemic on March 11, 2020, Japanese news media and the 
public angrily condemned the delayed (March 25) government 
response. Specifically, TV programs and newspapers continued to 
loudly criticize the countermeasures by the government in April, 2020, 
despite the low level of cases and a small number of deaths, compared 
to US and EUs (although, the worst in the East Asia). Those criticisms 
included themes like "too late lockdown on April 7,” "increase more and 
more PCR testing as soon as possible,” and "legalize and enforce the 
lockdown in ways similar to other countries". The media seemed 
convinced and acted as if the government was responsible for 
everything in this pandemic crisis. Those who took this position cited 
Taiwan, Hong Kong, Korea, and New Zealand's success against 
COVID-19 as examples. Lockdown was seen as the key factor for 
success.  
On May 8, 2020, Prime Minister Abe decided to continue the 
state of emergency to the end of May. This was the result of some 
politicians pandering to above critics. Another "flip-flop" critique began 
at this time. News media and members of the public began to criticize 
the extension of the emergency state declaration. Additionally, they 
argued that "the closures of stores and restaurants without 
compensation were wrong,” "no necessity to deliver masks at the high 
cost of 436 million USD (USD1.00=JPY110)". 
Additional "flip-flop" critique, again, began from mid-April, 2020, 
after the first wave peaked out. On June 7, the government announced 
that it would provide huge economic support to the travel industry 
(transportation, accommodation, and hotel and lodging) because such 
sectors had been damaged strongly during "quasi-lockdown". It should 
be noted that the constitution of Japan prohibits the restriction of 
movement. Therefore, the lockdowns in Japan are always implemented 
as if they are based on people's own voluntarily decisions, rather than 
on government edicts. The travel-support program was called, "GO 
TRAVEL campaign” (and later GO EAT, enjoy EVENTS, and 
Neighborhood Shopping Centers were asked to join in). This program 
was budgeted at about 15.3 billion USD. This budget would be used 
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primarily to offer price discounts to traveling consumers. Travelers could 
buy discounted transportation, lodging, and accommodation – up to a 
maximum of 35% – and later the government would compensate the 
sellers. 
Most of negative opinions against the GO TRAVEL approach 
insisted the campaign should cease to operate, immediately. One of the 
biggest newspapers, Yomiuri Shinbunsha, surveyed public opinions on 
July 7, 2020. Their survey showed that 67% people replied that they 
would refrain from traveling, and only 15% of the people said they would 
plan small trips (e.g., in their own town and city, not across long 
distances or international borders). 
Despite negative opinions, GO TRAVEL began on July 22, 
2020. Many surveys about this campaign have been done. Results 
often showed negative attitude against any form of GO TRAVEL, even 
though new pandemic cases decreasing drastically before the 
campaign. Once the campaign began, the cases rapidly increased and, 
by August 7, 2020, reached 1605 per day. This number was the peak in 
the second wave. In a later assessment, the Japan Tourism Agency 
estimated that a total 52.6 million people used this campaign and the 
total amount of subsidy of 3.1 billion USD was given out till the end of 
November 2020. The campaign seemed to have achieved enough 
success, in spite of many negative opinions. 
Though new cases had been decreasing from early August to 
middle of October, they started increasing again in October, 2020. 
Since October 25, the cases increased rapidly and, by November 14, 
reached 1736 per day. Some regional governors concluded that this 
was the result of the GO TRAVEL campaign. The campaign was 
suspended on December 28, 2020. 
What the foregoing discussion shows is that the "flip-flop" 
process about public opinions in Japan regarding COVID-19 
countermeasures continued throughout 2020: the Chinese New Year, 
reactions to WHO pandemic declaration, Olympics postponement, the 
voluntary vs. strict lockdown debates, the pro/con of the GO TRAVEL 
incentive campaign, and so on. 
Interestingly, both sides of discussion always disappeared 
soon. For example, against the second wave of COVID-19 pandemic, 
some politicians – for instance, the governor of Tokyo, Koike – kept 
asking the public to avoid infecting others, still attempting to keep 
prohibitions on going out. In general, most of the governors in Japan 
started mitigating the restrictions of the declared emergency by June, 
2020. Therefore, the famous extreme-crowded-commuters in trains 
were back and restaurants and shops reopened. Then, the Japanese 
realized that they seemed to be coping with the COVID-19 pandemic 
well. And, they believed they would ‘unlearn’ the restrictive COVID-19 
pandemic behaviors soon. 
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What can we learn from such flip-flop adaptation processes, that 
often – to external observers – appear to be funny-appearing 
processes, and the Japanese attitudes to major uncertainty producing 
events, like COVID-19? Perhaps, the lesson is the quick unlearning and 
always occurring adjustments. It can be characterized as momentary 
and ephemeral sequences of attitudes. 
Such adaptation processes have been commented on as being 
parts of the Japanese traditional culture. The book The Chrysanthemum 
and the Sword by Ruth Benedict (1946) – heavily criticized for being a 
purely desk-research-based book, but also praised nonetheless for 
some insights – noted that the Japanese are “both aggressive and 
unaggressive, both militaristic and aesthetic, both insolent and polite, 
rigid and adaptable, submissive and resentful of being pushed around, 
loyal and treacherous, brave and timid, conservative and hospitable to 
new ways...” (p. 2). 
Kent (1999), a western scholar teaching in Japan (and hence 
well-versed in Japanese language and culture), in her review of the 
Ruth Benedict book, made two key observations. Kent noted that the 
book, despite its ‘armchair research’ limitation, became a way for the 
Japanese to discover their own identity. The book, firstly, was regarded 
as a report by a researcher from the nation victorious in World War II, 
pointing out the peculiarities of (at that time, regarded as 
‘under-modernized’) Japan. As the book gained in popularity, much 
more in Japan than in the West, another understanding became more 
accepted. It became clear that such research (e.g., the Benedict book) 
relativized each country's culture, and pointed out that Japan's was not 
‘under-modernized’. Indeed, despite the view of being under-modern, 
the Japanese found themselves doing very well, in economic and 
cultural terms. 
Generally, when some external critiques and arguments appear, 
the Japanese are initially afraid of these, but then – as a result of such 
critiques – often become more intensely aware of (and often more 
accepting of) what they are doing. Based on this understanding, the 
flip-flop process can be seen as also a manageable approach to adapt 
to COVID-19 pandemic crisis. 
During the COVID-19 emergency, newspapers, TV channels, 
and Social Networking Sites (SNS) said that the best thing we could do 
now was to stay home. The Japanese often said, "I do what I can do 
now." This attitude stems from the logic-confusion that does not 
distinguish between what we can do and what we should do. Logically, 
to do "what we should do" comes from a plan, especially from a detailed 
plan. In contrast, to do "what we can do, now" comes from a contingent 
response to events. The former demands analysis and forecasts about 
the future, the latter asks adaptation by the available skills and 
adjustments to ongoing events. 
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Apparently, Japanese are good at the latter adjustments. During 
this pandemic, Japanese have dealt with many trials, such as washing 
hands for 30 seconds, wearing masks, gargling, staying home, avoiding 
dense, intimate, and close-contact settings, working at home (remote 
work or tele-work), and BCG (Bacillus Calmette-Guérin vaccine, the 
anti-tuberculosis vaccine, given to babies). Because of these multiple 
factors at play, we do not know the true reasons why Japan has coped 
with COVID-19 reasonably effectively. In addition, when some of these 
measures work, we unlearn what we have done; then, we move on the 
next stage. This speed of change is an indigenous characteristic of the 
Japanese. If there is something other countries can learn from Japan, it 
is to create a new mode of everyday life and adapt to it, rather than 
expecting to return to everyday life before COVID-19. Of course, the 
pandemic story is ongoing – as is the learning and the unlearning 
process from this pandemic. 
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